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NOTES AND COMMENTS
This adherence to precedent in a matter of such vast public impor-
tance differs from the court's practices in constitutional matters
where precedents have only been given such force as the expediency
of the time dmanded. That the same court which permitted the
United States Steel Corporation,'2 a capitalistic organization, to control
more than 50% of the trade and which permitted in the United States
Shoe machinery case,17 a capitalistic organization to control nearly
all of the industry to be organized should find the refusal to work of
the Journeymen in the Bedford case an unreasonable conspiracy in
violation of the Sherman Law seems to import a disbelief in the
soundness of labor organization rather than a strict adherence to any
technical rules of law.
M. IT.
DoWER IN EQUITABLE ESTATES-'I.ie broad principle that a widow
shall have a right to a life interest in one third of all the estates of
inheritance of which her husband was seized during coverture was
recognized in the Magna Carta.' However, at common law, dower
attached only to legal estates of inheritance and was not recognized
in equitable estates. This doctrine was definitely laid down in the
case of Radnor v. Vandebendy.2 Here the court was faced with the
principle that equity follows the law, but refused to allow the wife
dower in real property of which her husband had an equitable estate.
This, even although two years prior, curtesy had been allowed to a
husband in the trust estates of his wife.3 This rule was subsequently
severely criticized timc and again,4 but nevertheless was reluctantly
"United States v. United Steel Corporation, 251 U. S. 417 (1920).
"United States v. United Shoe Machinery Co., 247 U. S. 32 (1918).
'McKechnie, Magna Carta (2nd Ed. 1914) 215.
' 16 Lords Jour. 159 (1697) where the court said: "'Tis nothing but
Precedent that consecrates Half the decrees in Equity. And no man
shall say, that ever any Woman was endowed in equity of a trust estate.
* * * So that Equity doth not exceed the Rules of Law in advancing the
Right of Dower. 'Tis true, unless Fraud be the case, Relief in Equity
shall not be given against a legal title to dower."
Prior to the Radnor case the decisions were in conflict. Colt v.
Colt, 1 Ch. Rep. 254 (1664) dismissing a bill in chancery for dower in a
trust estate. Contra, Fletcher v. Robinson (1653), quoted from Register's
book in Banks v. Sutton, 2 Wins. (Piere). 700, 710-712 (1732).
Snell v. Clay, 2 Vein. 324 (1695). And thus the doctrine became
settled that a husband shall have curtesy in a trust estate, but the widow
shall not have dower.
Chaplin v. Chaplin, 3 Wins. (Piere) 229 (1733); Burgess v. Wheate,
1 Win. Bl. 123 (1759) per Lord C. J. Mansfield. ". . . it has been declared
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followed until the Dower Acts of 1834 5 which remedied the situa-
tion and abrogated Radnor v. Vandebendy. So that at present a wife
is endowed not only in the legal estates of inheritance, of which her
husband was seized during coverture, but also, of the equitable estates
of which her husband died seized. This rule is said to obtain in New
York today.,
In the latest New York case trenching upon the subject, the
defendant, for the purpose of defeating his wife's right of dower in
certain premises of which he was seized, procured her to join in a
smhll mortgage on the premises. When the mortgage fell due, al-
though able to, be refused to pay the same, had the mortgage fore-
closed, to which action the wife was made a party, and at the fore-
closure sale bought the premises in through his attorney. Subse-
quently, in pursuance to the defendant's wishes, the attorney con-
veyed the premises to the defendant's sister, without any considera-
tion whatsoever. The action, brought by the wife to have the con-
veyance set aside as fraudulent as against her, and to establish ier
inchoate right of dower was upheld.
The first class of equitable estates in which the wife is entitled
to dower is a trust estate wherein the husband is the cestui que. This
rule applies to all trust estates, estates in fee including implied or
resulting trusts.8 Thus where A contracts to buy real estate from
B, the latter is deemed to have the legal title in trust for A, who is
that a husband should be tenant per curtesy of a trust, the case of dower
is the only exception, anl not on law and reason, but because that wrong
determination has misled in too many instances to be now altered and set
right. Radnor against Vandebendy was determined on that principle only
in the House of Lords."
' (1834) 3 and 4 William IV., ch. 105, § 3.
"When a husband shall die, beneficially entitled to any land for an
interest which shall not entitle his widow to dower out of the same at
law, and such interest, whether wholly equitable, or partly legal and partly
equitable, shall an estate of inheritance in possession, or equal to an
estate of inheritance (other than an estate in joint tenancy) then his
widow shall be entitled in equity to dower out of the same land."
'Hawley v. James, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 318 (1835); Hicks v. Stebbins,
3 Lans. (N. Y.) 89 (4th Dept. 1870); Matter of McKay, 5 Misc. (N. Y.)
123 (1893).
'Byrnes v. Owens, 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51 (1926).
"Nichols v. Parks 78 App. Div. 95 (1st Dept. 1903). Inchoate right
of dower does not attach to equitable estates, the court holding, "General
rule is that if the husband, during his life time disposes of any equitable
estate he may have in lands, the dower right of his wife therein will be
defeated. It is only of such equitable estates as he may possess at the
time of his death that she can claim dower." See also Smallridge v.
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the beneficial owner. If A should die before taking legal title, and
has not assigned the contract, his widow will be entitled to dower
therein, subject to the equities of the vendor.9 In such cases the
executor or administrator will be compelled to complete the transac-
tion even to the extent of using all the esfate of the deceased,10 the
title then vesting in trust for the heirs, subject to the wife's dower."1
It should be noted that if the deceased was not entitled to specific per-
formance, because of some default on his part, the right of dower is
lost. 2  Further, in New York, if the husband aliens such estate by
assignment of the contract, in absence of fraud the wife will not be
endowed.' 3
At common law where A contracted for real estate, paid the
purchase price with his funds but had title taken in the name of an-
other, the law presumed a trust in favor of A.' 4  This rule has since
been abrogated, and today where the husband has paid the purchase
price the taking of title in a third person, in the absence of fraud, is
presumed, by law to be a gift, not a trust. 5 A New York statute ' 6
Hazlett, 112 Ky. 841, 66 S. W. 1043 (1902); C. F. James v. Upton, 96 Va.
296, 31 S. E. 255 (1898); Nortnass v. Pioneer Townsite Co. 82 Neb. 382,
117 N. W. 951 (1908).
'Walsh, Law of Real Property (1915) 164, Malin v. Coult, 4 Ind.
535, (1853) ; Williams -v. Kierny, 6 N. Y. St. Rep. 560, 43 Hun. (N. Y.) 1
(4th Dept. 1887).
'Supra, note 9; 19 C. J. 479, § 71.
"C. P. A.
'Supra, note 9.
" Supra, note 8. Where the husband contracts to buy real estate, and
then assigns the contract; this without more is not fraud on the wife,
because while a husband may not deprive his wife of her dower by fraud,
after the inchoate right has attached, he is under no obligation to take
his money in which his wife has no interest and put it in land in his
own name so that she may obtain a dower interest. Nichols v. Parks,
supra, note 8.
" O'Brien v. Gill, 166 App. Div. 92, 151 N. Y. Supp. 682 (2nd 1915) ; Mon-
ahan v. Holmes, 58 Misc. 86, 110 N. Y. Supp. 300 (1908).
"McKinley v. Hessen, 135 App. Div. 832 (2nd Dept. 1909); A hus-
band cannot defeat his wife's right of dower by taking a conveyance of
land during coverture, to himself for life with remainder to his child.
where the intent is to defraud her. Cornelius v. Horst, 11 Mo. App. 304,
(1881). Where a judgment has heen procured for the express purpose of
defeating the wife's right of dower, the court refused to divest her of
same. Monroe v. Crouse, 59 Hun (N. Y.) 248, 12 N. Y. Supp. 815 (1891).
"Real Prop. L. § 94; Monahan v. Holmes, supra, note 14, where the
guardian bought certain premises with his ward's funds, taking title in her
name, a trust was declared in favor of the child.
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provides that no trust shall result in such a case unless title is taken
by such third person either without the knowledge of the person-
paying or in violation of some trust.
The next class of cases are those where the title is taken by a
trustee upon whom no active duties are imposed. By statute 17 a
dry or naked trust imposing no active duties on the trustee is void,
and neither legal nor equitable title thereto vests in the trustee. The
title, both legal and equitable vest in the cestui que.'8 However, in
order for this rule to apply the agreement, if any to reconvey by the
naked trustee, must be in writing or the trust must have existed at
the time of the grant.' 9 In such cases there is no question as to
the wife's dower inasmuch as the husband is seized of a legal estate
of inheritance. In the case of Phelps v. Phelps, 20 the purchase price
was paid by the husband, and title taken in the name of a third per-
son. The agreement between the third person and husband made no
mention of reconveyance, but merely stated the husband should re-
ceive the benefits of and have full control over the premises. The
court there held that since the husband was seized of neither a legal
nor equitable estate, the wife shall not be endowed therein. The hus-
band merely had an action for breach of contract if the third party
refused to go through. It is further submitted that even if there had
been an equitable estate vested in the husband, the action would still
have been untenable, inasmuch as the action was brought during the
life-time of the husband, and since no fraud was averred or shown
the husband could have alienated the estate at his pleasure.
A new aspect of this problem was presented to the court in
Melenky v. Melen. 21 There the oral agreement to reconvey was be-
tween father and son and the courts have frequently held that such
relationships takes the situation out of the statute of frauds. In
the Melenky case the defendant's father conveyed the property to his
son so that he might manage the property during his absence and
promote business convenience. There was an oral promise to recon-
vey. The plaintiff subsequent to the conveyance, but relying on the
statement that the father owned valuable real estate, married him.
The son then refused to reconvey and the plaintiff brings this action
to have her inchoate right. of dower established and a reconveyance
"Real Prop. L. § 93.
"Starbuck v. Starbuck 62 App. Div. 437 (2nd Dept. 1901).
" Bates v. L. M. Co. 130 N. Y. 200, 29 N. E. 102 (1891); Wend v.
Walsh, 164 N. Y. 154, 58 N. E. 2 (1900).
-143 N. Y. 197, 38 N. E. 28 (1894), 25 L. R. A. 625.
"233 N. Y. 19, 134 N. E. 822 (1922).
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adjudged, the son having refused to reconvey at the father's request.
The court per Cardozo J. held that since no fraud was proven against
the plaintiff she could not compel reconveyance to the husband.
Further the court met the proposition which would be presented by
the constructive trust by saying the husband was not seized of an
equitable estate.
Where fraud has permeated the transaction, such as in the
Byrnes case, and it may be shown that the conveyance of the estate
whether legal or equitable was for the express purpose of defeating
the wife's right of dower, the conveyance will be set aside and the
inchoate dower established.2 2  It is not necessary in such cases thit
the wife wait until the death of the husband in order to bring the
action, she may come in as soon as she discovers the fraud. Thus,
in Youngs v. Carter,23 the plaintiff's husband, before marriage, but
in contemplation thereof, made a voluntary conveyance to one of his
relatives. After marriage, upon discovery of said facts, plaintiff
brought an action to have the conveyance set aside and her inchoate
right of dower established. The court in rendering a judgment in
the plaintiff's favor, laid down the rule that where a husband, prior
to the marriage, in order to defeat his wife's dower, fraudulently
conveys his real estate, the wife upon discovery of same may bring
an equitable action to set aside the conveyance in order to protect
her dower rights.2 4 The case of Douglas v. Douglas, 25 illustrates the
rule that where a wife is induced by her husband to join in a deed,
thereby relinquishing her inchoate right of dower, upon his represen-
tation that the dower will attach to lands to be received in exchange,
and he without her knowledge or consent has the title taken in his
sister's name. Upon proof thereof, the wife may come in and have
" Supra note 15, infra, notes 23, 24, 25, see also Higgins v. Higgins,
219 IMI. 146, 76 N. E. 86 (1905); Bookout v. Bookout, 150 Ind. 63, 49 N.
E. 824 (1898); Ward v. Ward, 63 Ohio, 125, 57 N. E. 1095 (1900); Nel-
son v. Brown, 164 Ala. 397, 51 So. 360 (1910); Wilson v. Wilson 32 Utah
169, 89 Pac. 643 (1907).
2 10 Hun (N. Y.) 194 (1st Dept. 1877).
' Supra, note 22.
' 11 Hun (N. Y.) 406 (1st Dept. 1878). Where a husband in order
to defeat his wife's right of dower, caused a mortgage to be foreclosed,
making his wife a party, and by collusion with a person who held his
contract to convey the premises for $18,000 managed to have the lands
sold to him for the amount of the mortgage; then settled with such per-
son and received the difference between the mortgage and sale, it was the
wife's right of dower was not barred by the sale. Turner v. Kuehnle,
70 N. J. Eq. 61, 62 Atl. 327 (1905). But where an innocent third party
enters into the transaction as purchaser for value, the action will not be
allowed. Allen v. Allen, 213 Mass. 29, 99 N. E. 462 (1912).
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the conveyance to the sister set aside and have title declared in her
husband so that her inchoate right of dower attaches.
The courts have repeatedly held that they will enforce a con-
structive trust for the grantor if there was a special confidential re-
lationship between the parties.2 6  Upon this hypothesis it has been
argued that there is factually no distinction, or a distinction without a
meaning, between an equitable estate and an equitable right.
2
T It
has been pointed out that in the Byrnes case the fraud was the
pivotal point of the decision whereas in the Melenky case no fraud
was found.28  It is claimed that in the Melenky case the court has
overlooked the fact that the father's representation to his wife im-
posed a duty to recover the property, but as the court holds "dower
attaches, not to choses in action but to estates."
Thus, in considering the question of whether when a husband has
been defrauded in parting with his land and thereby his wife's in-
choate right of dower is extinguished, there is a duty imposed upon
him to come in and have the conveyance set aside, thus reestablishing
her inchoate right of dower, it is submitted that there is neither a
duty in the husband nor a right in the wife to have the conveyance set
aside, unless fraud as against the wife may be proved. The husband's
acquiescence to the transaction as it stands, and refusal to bring the
action is not such fraud as will entitle her to bring the action. It is
conceded that this rule may work a grave injustice, especially where
the defrauded husband died before he could avail himself of the
fraud, but in such a case neither the wife, nor the heirs at law, nor
personal representatives could avail themselves of the fraud, and
therefore the action would be lost, but nevertheless the rule is ab-
solute and the wrong to the husband is the misfortune of the wife.
A. M. LA P.
'Bradley Co. v. Bradley, 165 Cal. 237, 131 Pac. 750 (1913); Mussey
v. Shaw, 274 Ill. 351, 113 N. E. 605 (1916); Henderson v. Murray, 108
Minn. 76, 121 N. W. 214 (1909); Thierry v. Thierry, 298 Mo. 25, 249 S.
W. 946 (1923), Harrington v. Shiller, 231 N. Y. 278, 132 N. E. 89 (1921);
Sinclair v. Purdy, 235 N. Y. 245, 139 N. E. 255 (1923); Hanson v.
Svarverend, 18 N. D. 550, 120 N. W. 550 (1909); Hatcher v. Hatcher,
264 Pa., 105, 107 Atl. 660 (1919).
' "The equitable title,' however, is one thing, and entirely different
from the right in equity to bring an equitable action to set aside a transfer
or to compel the performance of a duty on the part of the grantee in
whom the legal title vests." Gabler v. Gabler, 118 Misc. 534, 193 N. Y.
Supp. 500 (1922).
'The court says: "This is not a case where the grantor has at-
tempted by a clandestine transfer of title to modify the incidents of
marriage about to be contracted. The transfer was made to promote his
(the husband's) business convenience when no marriage was in view. He
is no subject to the reproach of plotting a fraud upon his wife." Cardozo
J. 233 N. Y. 19, 23, 24 (1922).
